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Effects of Divided Attention at
Retrieval on Conceptual Implicit
Memory
Matthew W. Prull*, Courtney Lawless, Helen M. Marshall and Annabella T. K. Sherman
Department of Psychology, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA, USA
This study investigated whether conceptual implicit memory is sensitive to process-
specific interference at the time of retrieval. Participants performed the implicit memory
test of category exemplar generation (CEG; Experiments 1 and 3), or the matched
explicit memory test of category-cued recall (Experiment 2), both of which are
conceptually driven memory tasks, under one of two divided attention (DA) conditions
in which participants simultaneously performed a distracting task. The distracting
task was either syllable judgments (dissimilar processes), or semantic judgments
(similar processes) on unrelated words. Compared to full attention (FA) in which no
distracting task was performed, DA had no effect on CEG priming overall, but reduced
category-cued recall similarly regardless of distractor task. Analyses of distractor task
performance also revealed differences between implicit and explicit memory retrieval.
The evidence suggests that, whereas explicit memory retrieval requires attentional
resources and is disrupted by semantic and phonological distracting tasks, conceptual
implicit memory is automatic and unaffected even when distractor and memory tasks
involve similar processes.
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INTRODUCTION
When we retrieve information from memory, we often do so in the context of an ongoing activity.
For example, we may try to remember the melody or lyrics to a song while we are driving, or we
may try to recall a person’s name while having a conversation with them. Under such situations,
our attention is said to be divided between memory retrieval and the demands of another task.
How is memory aﬀected under such conditions compared to situations in which an ongoing task
is absent and one can devote full attention (FA) to retrieval? Are diﬀerent types of memory aﬀected
diﬀerently when attention is divided at the time of retrieval?
Somewhat surprisingly, relatively few studies have tackled these questions. Most studies of
divided attention (DA) and memory have focused on encoding rather than retrieval, and those
studies show clearly that DA aﬀects many kinds of memory. Speciﬁcally, using a procedure in
which participants perform a distracting or secondary task simultaneously while encoding new
information, researchers have shown that performance on explicit memory tests of recall or
recognition is sharply reduced compared to a FA condition in which attention is not diverted at
encoding. In these studies, virtually any distracting task has a negative eﬀect onmemory (Murdock,
1965; Baddeley et al., 1984; Fisk and Schneider, 1984; Craik et al., 1996; Anderson et al., 1998;
Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998, 2000; see Mulligan, 2008, for a review).
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Attention at encoding is also necessary for implicit memory,
in which memories are revealed in performance changes on
tasks that make no reference to study events and do not
require the deliberate retrieval processes that are involved in
explicit memory. In such studies, encoding-phase DA reduces
repetition priming, a form of implicit memory, on some but not
all implicit memory tests (e.g., Parkin et al., 1990; Schmitter-
Edgecombe, 1996; Szymanski and MacLeod, 1996; Mulligan,
1998; Gabrieli et al., 1999; Light et al., 2000; Rajaram et al., 2001;
Mulligan and Peterson, 2008; see Spataro et al., 2011 for review).
Two theoretical perspectives help understand the variation in
outcomes. The transfer-appropriate processing perspective, or
TAP, divides implicit memory tests into perceptually driven and
conceptually driven categories. Perceptually driven tests such as
word stem completion (complete squ___ with the ﬁrst word that
comes to mind) and lexical decision (is squash a word?) present
stimuli in degraded, speeded, or other perceptually challenging
forms. Perceptual priming occurs when studied items come to
mind, or are processed faster, compared to unstudied items.
Such priming is said to be perceptual in nature because it is
aﬀected by changing the perceptual similarity between test stimuli
and study stimuli. In contrast, conceptually driven tests, such as
word association (gourd - ?) or category veriﬁcation (is squash
a vegetable?), present test stimuli to which participants respond
based on semantic knowledge. Conceptual priming occurs when
studied items come to mind, or are processed faster, compared
to unstudied items, but in this case priming is said to be
conceptual because it is sensitive to study-phase manipulations
of conceptual processing, not manipulations of study-to-test
perceptual similarity (Roediger and McDermott, 1993). DA at
encoding aﬀects priming on many conceptually driven implicit
memory tests and does not aﬀect many perceptually driven tests,
although there are some exceptions to that pattern (e.g., Light
et al., 2000; Mulligan and Hornstein, 2000). That pattern is
explained by the TAP perspective by assuming that encoding-
phase DA hampers conceptual but not perceptual processing of
stimuli, thereby aﬀecting conceptual but not perceptual priming
(Roediger and McDermott, 1993).
Alternatively, the identiﬁcation-production perspective divides
implicit memory tests into those that require identiﬁcation of a
stimulus cue or classiﬁcation of one of its attributes (e.g., lexical
decision and category veriﬁcation tests, above), and those that
cannot be completed by merely identifying test cues but instead
require participants to go beyond the given cue information
and produce a response from one of several candidate options
(e.g., word stem completion and word association tests above;
Gabrieli et al., 1994, 1999). Identiﬁcation and production priming
tasks can be either perceptual or conceptual in nature, and
the identiﬁcation-production perspective states explicitly that
attention plays a critical role in production priming but far
less so in identiﬁcation priming. Attention at encoding may
assist with resolving competition among multiple candidate
responses at the time of test; this resolution of competition
is thought to be common in production priming but not
identiﬁcation priming tasks (Gabrieli et al., 1999). Consistent
with these views, encoding-phase DA impacts many production
priming tasks without aﬀecting many identiﬁcation priming
tasks, although as with TAP, there are a few exceptions to
this pattern (e.g., Light and Prull, 1995; Schmitter-Edgecombe,
1999).
Less is known how explicit and implicit memory are aﬀected
when encoding takes place under FA conditions and DA is
manipulated at retrieval. With respect to explicit memory,
DA at retrieval was initially found to have little or no eﬀect
on recall and recognition compared to FA at retrieval, a
surprising result that led to the view that explicit memory
retrieval was relatively automatic and did not require attentional
resources (the automatic retrieval hypothesis; Baddeley et al.,
1984). Nevertheless, DA at retrieval is associated with robust
performance decrements on the distracting task when compared
to performance in a baseline condition in which the distracting
task is performed alone, in the absence of the memory task (Craik
et al., 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998). This ﬁnding led Craik
et al. (1996) to conclude that retrieval is not automatic in the
strictest sense, as it clearly requires attentional resources, but that
retrieval is protected or privileged over other ongoing tasks and
is therefore aﬀected little, if at all, by distraction.
Nevertheless, under some conditions, retrieval-phase DA
eﬀects on explicit memory can be substantial (Jacoby, 1991;
Hicks and Marsh, 2000; Lozito and Mulligan, 2006). One
crucial factor appears to be whether the distracting task and
the memory task use similar materials. In a series of studies,
Fernandes and Moscovitch (2000, 2002, 2003; Skinner and
Fernandes, 2008) found that distracting tasks whose materials
mismatched (e.g., digits) the to-be-remembered material (e.g.,
words) had little impact on recall performance, but distracting
tasks whose materials matched the to-be-remembered material
(i.e., both memory and distracting tasks used word stimuli) had
considerable negative eﬀects on recall. This material-speciﬁc DA
eﬀect suggests that explicit memory retrieval is most aﬀected
when other concurrent tasks compete for information in a
common representational system (Fernandes and Moscovitch,
2000).
Very little is known how DA aﬀects implicit memory at the
time of retrieval, and only a handful of studies have systematically
investigated this issue (Clarke and Butler, 2008; Lozito and
Mulligan, 2010). These studies have generally provided good
support for the automatic retrieval hypothesis as applied to
implicit memory. Clarke and Butler (2008) found that a
syllable monitoring distracting task had no eﬀect on word-
stem completion priming, in which words are studied and
participants respond to word stems (e.g., sta___) with the ﬁrst
word that comes to mind. However, the same distracting task
had a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the matched explicit test
of cued recall.1 Lozito and Mulligan (2010) used a variety of
1Two studies have also examined retrieval-phase DA eﬀects on word-stem
associative priming in which context-target word pairs are studied (e.g., hat – limes,
gutter – coat, dove – sting) and participants respond to test items consisting of target
word stems presented with the same context word that appeared at encoding (hat –
lim___) or with a diﬀerent context word (gutter – sti____). Associative priming
occurs when targets are producedmore often in the same context than in a diﬀerent
context. Gooding et al. (1999) found no DA eﬀect on associative priming when
mental arithmetic was the distracting task at retrieval, however, Kinoshita (1999)
found a DA eﬀect on associative priming when a digit monitoring task was the
distracting task. The present study focuses on priming of single items rather than
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distracting tasks and multiple implicit memory tasks such as
perceptual identiﬁcation, word-stem completion, and category
exemplar generation (CEG) to investigate retrieval-phase DA
eﬀects on implicit memory. Priming was unaﬀected in every
case, regardless of whether distracting tasks required frequent or
occasional responses (which can sometimes determine whether
encoding-phase DA eﬀects occur for implicit memory; see
Mulligan, 2003; Mulligan et al., 2007), and regardless of whether
distracting task materials overlapped with the implicit memory
tasks. Together, these studies provide good support for the
automaticity hypothesis, and they join additional studies that
have reported little or no eﬀect of retrieval-phase DA on other
automatic uses of memory such as artiﬁcial grammar learning,
false fame, or estimates of familiarity in recognition (Jacoby et al.,
1989; Jacoby, 1991; Helman and Berry, 2003).
The purpose of this study is to test the automatic retrieval
hypothesis further by manipulating the overlap in processes,
rather than materials, shared by the distracting task and implicit
memory task. Fernandes and Guild (2009) have argued that
process-speciﬁc DA eﬀects can occur in explicit memory, in
which memory performance diminishes when both memory
and distractor tasks compete for the same set of processes
at the time of retrieval. When tasks compete for diﬀerent
processes, interference is not as great and memory performance
is aﬀected less. In support of these assertions, Fernandes and
Guild (2009) found that, relative to an FA condition, recognition
memory for spatial patterns was reduced more by a distracting
task involving visuospatial judgments about letters that were
presented aurally (deciding whether letters have curved lines
when printed), than by a distracting task that involved making
phonological judgments on the same letters (deciding whether
each letter rhymed with “e”). The opposite pattern of results
was found when the memory task involved words: recognition
performance diminished more under the phonological distractor
task than under the visuospatial distractor task. Note that
this outcome cannot be due to a material-speciﬁc DA eﬀect,
as the materials in the distractor task remained constant. In
another study (Wammes and Fernandes, 2015), participants were
given recognition tests for upright or inverted faces that they
had studied. Memory for upright faces is thought to depend
on processing holistic or conﬁgural interrelationships between
face details, whereas memory for inverted faces is thought to
depend on processing speciﬁc, stand-alone features. Accordingly,
recognition memory for upright faces was negatively aﬀected
more by a distracting task that also required holistic processing
than one that required featural processing, whereas the reverse
outcome occurred when participants studied and recognized
inverted faces. Other such demonstrations of process-speciﬁc
interference have been reported in a variety of short-term and
working memory tasks (e.g., Brooks, 1968; denHeyer and Barrett,
1971; Pellegrino et al., 1975; Logie et al., 1990; Robbins et al.,
1996).
The current study examined implicit memory under DA
conditions at the time of retrieval, using distractor tasks that
priming of new associations, and thus these mixed results are not considered
further.
either did or did not overlap with the implicit memory task in
terms of processes. We used the CEG task in this investigation
because it should be particularly sensitive to DA eﬀects according
to the TAP and identiﬁcation-production frameworks. The
CEG task requires participants to provide the ﬁrst example
of a category (e.g., crow) in response to a category name
(e.g., a type of bird). Priming is revealed to the extent that
studied exemplars are produced more often than the baseline
rate of responding when exemplars are unstudied. The CEG
task is classiﬁed as a conceptually driven implicit memory
test and involves stimulus production, and both TAP and the
identiﬁcation-production accounts converge in predicting DA
eﬀects on priming on such a task. Indeed, encoding-phase DA
produces robust decrements in CEG priming (see Spataro et al.,
2011).
Lozito andMulligan (2010) found no retrieval-phase DA eﬀect
on CEG priming, but they manipulated only the similarity of
materials shared by the distracting task and memory task. We
address the open question of whether such priming is sensitive
to process-speciﬁc interference. In the present study, we used
one distractor task that required phonological processing of
words (syllable judgments). Phonological processing overlaps
relatively little with the semantic or conceptual processes
involved in generating an example to a category. We also used
a distractor task that required semantic processing of words
(abstract/concrete judgments), which overlaps considerably more
with the conceptual processes underlying the CEG task. From a
neuroscience perspective, these same phonological and semantic
judgment tasks activate diﬀerent regions within the left prefrontal
lobe (e.g., Poldrack et al., 1999). The fact that phonological
distractor tasks did not aﬀect conceptual priming (Lozito and
Mulligan, 2010) could reﬂect a successful coordination of
diﬀerent processes across diﬀerent brain regions. In contrast,
semantic judgments to words and conceptual priming involve
activations and deactivations within the same left prefrontal
region (e.g., Raichle et al., 1994; Gabrieli et al., 1996). Thus, a
distractor task that incorporates semantic processes should be
most likely to aﬀect priming in the CEG task.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, participants studied a list of category exemplars
under FA. They then completed a CEG task under conditions
of FA, DA involving syllable judgments on distractor words,
or DA involving semantic judgments on distractor words. In
all cases, the material overlap between distractor task and
memory task was held constant, only the type of processing
performed on the distractor stimuli varied. According to the
automatic retrieval hypothesis, priming on the CEG task should
be unaﬀected by either of the two DA tasks. However, if
priming is sensitive to process-speciﬁc interference, the semantic
distractor task should reduce priming relative to the other two
conditions.
The automatic retrieval hypothesis can also be evaluated
by examining how the CEG task inﬂuences distractor task
performance, which we call distractor task costs. We followed
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Lozito and Mulligan’s (2010) method for examining distractor
task costs. First, global costs can be assessed by comparing
performance on the distractor task when performed under
DA (i.e., when the CEG task is performed simultaneously) to
that of a baseline condition in which the distractor task is
performed alone. Worse performance on the distractor task
under DA conditions, compared to baseline, would indicate
that the CEG task itself is attention-demanding. However, such
information would not speak to the attentional demands of
implicit memory retrieval. Speciﬁc costs do so, however. Such
costs refer to performance decrements on the distractor task on
trials where category names correspond to studied exemplars
(studied trials), compared to category names that correspond
to unstudied exemplars (unstudied trials) in the DA conditions.
Such costs, either to distractor task accuracy or response time
(RT), would signal that implicit memory retrieval is attention-
demanding. However, if the automatic retrieval hypothesis is
correct, distractor task performance should not be negatively
aﬀected in studied trials (i.e., no speciﬁc costs). Lozito and
Mulligan (2010) reported precisely that outcome, and in fact
found speciﬁc beneﬁts in some cases such that studied trials
facilitated the distractor task by increasing accuracy or decreasing
reaction times. In the present experiment, we included a
baseline phase of distractor task trials so that we could calculate
global attentional costs, and we analyzed distractor performance
separately for studied and unstudied trials in the DA conditions
in order to assess speciﬁc costs.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight people (31 women, 17 men) participated in
Experiment 1 for course credit or for pay. In this and in
all subsequent experiments, participants were undergraduate
students of traditional age (18–22 years) enrolled at Whitman
College. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants. All experiments reported in this article were carried
out with approval from the Institutional Review Board at
Whitman College.
Materials and Design
We selected one exemplar from each of 60 diﬀerent categories
to create a master list of 60 critical items. The items and
categories were selected from several diﬀerent norms and the
items were never among the top three responses for their
respective category (Hunt and Hodge, 1971; McEvoy and Nelson,
1982; Van Overschelde et al., 2004; Yoon et al., 2004). We
avoided proper names and compounds (e.g., ﬂip-ﬂop, foxtrot).
This master list was divided into two lists, each 30 items in
length. We placed two primacy buﬀers at the beginning and two
recency buﬀers at the end of each list to create two 34-item lists,
one of which served as the studied, or old, list while the other
served as the unstudied, or new, list. The presentation of these
two lists as studied or unstudied was counterbalanced across
participants.
The test included 90 category names. Thirty category
names corresponded to the list of 30 studied exemplars that
was presented during the study phase, 30 category names
corresponded to the remaining exemplars on the second list,
which were unstudied, and 30 ﬁller category names corresponded
to none of the exemplars but were included in the test in an
eﬀort to disguise the connection between the study phase and test
phase.
The test phase occurred under conditions of FA, DA
involving syllable judgments (DA-Syllable), or DA involving
semantic judgments (DA-Semantic). In all cases during the test,
participants heard 180 nouns spoken through the computer
speakers and saw the 90 category names on the computer screen.
None of the 180 words was a reasonable exemplar of any category
tested, and these words remained constant for all participants.
A quarter of these words had two syllables and referred to abstract
entities (reason, beauty), another quarter were two-syllable words
that referred to concrete entities (cashew, lever), a third quarter
were not two-syllable words and referred to abstract entities
(joy, creation), and the last quarter were not two-syllable words
and referred to concrete entities (acrobat, foam). Participants
in the FA condition ignored the spoken words and focused all
their attention on performing the CEG task. Participants in the
two DA conditions responded to the spoken words with either
syllable judgments or semantic judgments while simultaneously
completing the CEG task.
The baseline task consisted of a separate group of 120 nouns
with similar properties as the DA distractor words just described.
The baseline words also remained constant across participants
and were divided into quarters according to two/not-two syllable
and abstract/concrete categories.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to FA, DA-Syllable, or
DA-Semantic conditions and were tested individually. All
participants began with the study phase in which one of
the two lists of exemplars was presented visually. Participants
made pleasantness judgments for each exemplar using keypress
responses (1 = unpleasant, 2 = neutral, 3 = pleasant). Each
word was presented individually for 3 s with a 500 ms blank
screen interstimulus interval (ISI). Encoding was incidental, as
participants were not told that their memory for the words would
be tested later, or that the words were exemplars of various
taxonomic categories. The study phase was followed by a choice
reaction time task administered on the computer that lasted
about 2 min and served merely as a ﬁller task in order to obscure
the nature of the experiment.
To obtain baseline rates of performance on the syllable
judgment task (for DA-Syllable participants) or the semantic
judgment task (for DA-Semantic participants), we presented
the 120-word list aurally for participants to make judgments
appropriate to the condition to which they were assigned. Each
word was spoken by a male voice one at a time and followed
by silence so that 3 s elapsed between the onset of each spoken
word. Sixty of these words were presented after the choice
RT task, immediately before the CEG task that is described in
the next paragraph. The remaining 60 words were presented
immediately after the CEG task. Participants therefore heard 60
words in each of two rounds of baseline performance. For those
in the DA-Syllable condition, participants pressed the slash key
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(/) on the keyboard, labeled “two,” if the word contained two
syllables, or they pressed the z key, labeled “not two,” if the word
contained anything other than two syllables. For those in the
DA-Semantic condition, participants pressed the slash key (/),
labeled “concrete,” if the word represented a concrete entity, or
they pressed the z key, labeled “abstract,” if the word represented
an abstract entity. Participants in the FA condition completed
only the ﬁrst round of the baseline task, and for them the task
served merely as a second distractor task before they advanced to
the CEG task. Half of the FA participants completed one round
of syllable judgments and the other half completed one round
of semantic judgments. In all cases, no more than three two-
syllable words, three not-two syllable words, three abstract, or
three concrete words occurred consecutively.
For the CEG task, participants saw 90 category names and
heard 180 words (see Figure 1 for a schematic). Category names
(e.g., “a dance”) were presented one at a time and remained
on the screen for 5.5 s followed by a 500 ms blank screen
ISI. Except for the ﬁrst ﬁve category names, which were all
ﬁllers, no more than two items from any of the three categories
(studied, unstudied, or ﬁller) occurred consecutively. Two spoken
words were heard for every one category name. One spoken
word was presented simultaneously with the visual onset of
the category name and a second spoken word was presented
3 s later, while the category name was still visible. As with the
baseline trials, no more than three two-syllable words, three
not-two syllable words, three abstract, or three concrete words
occurred consecutively. All participants were instructed to use
each category name as a cue to say aloud the ﬁrst example of
the category that came to mind. Those in the DA-Syllable and
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the category exemplar generation test. At the
beginning of each trial, a category name appeared and remained continuously
on the screen for 5.5 s. A spoken word was also presented simultaneously
with the onset of the category name (simultaneous distractor). Three seconds
later, a second spoken word was presented (delayed distractor). Each trial
was separated by a 500 ms blank screen. In the full attention (FA) condition,
participants responded to the category names with the first example that
came to mind. In the divided attention (DA) conditions, participants
additionally responded to the spoken words, either by making syllable
judgments (DA-Syllable) or abstract/concrete judgments (DA-Semantic).
DA-Semantic conditions additionally responded to the spoken
words, making two/not-two or abstract/concrete responses by
keypress in the same way as during the ﬁrst round of baseline
trials. All DA participants were instructed to emphasize both
tasks equally and to perform both tasks to the best of their
abilities. Those in the FA condition were told to ignore the spoken
words entirely, as they would only distract them from performing
the CEG task, and to focus all their attention on completing the
CEG task. Two short breaks were provided during the test, one
after the 30th category name then another after the 60th category
name.
After the CEG task, those in the DA-Syllable and DA-
Semantic tasks completed the second round of baseline trials
on the remaining 60 baseline words, and then completed an
awareness questionnaire. Those in the FA condition proceeded
immediately to the awareness questionnaire upon completion of
the CEG task. The awareness questionnaire assessed the degree
to which participants became aware of the connection between
the study phase and the test phase. The awareness questionnaire
was modeled after those used by others (Bowers and Schacter,
1990; Barnhardt and Geraci, 2008) and consisted of six funnel
questions ranging from general (what do you think was the
purpose of the task in which you gave examples of various categories
while hearing words?) to speciﬁc (if you noticed that some of
the examples you gave were the words that you had rated for
pleasantness, did you intentionally try to use those words as
responses to the categories?). Such questionnaires are routinely
used in implicit memory research and provide valid methods for
assessing awareness (Barnhardt and Geraci, 2008).
Results
Encoding
Participants provided pleasantness ratings to 99.0, 99.6, and
99.8 percent of the critical words in the FA, DA-Syllable,
and DA-Semantic conditions, respectively. These diﬀerences
were not reliable by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA),
F(2,45) = 1.50, p = 0.23 (unless stated otherwise, two-tailed
α= 0.05 throughout).
Implicit Memory
The proportions of critical items produced on the CEG test for
all participants are shown in the top half of Table 1. A one-
way ANOVA on baseline rates of responding with critical words
when they were unstudied revealed no reliable diﬀerence across
groups, F < 1. Therefore, we computed priming scores as the
proportion of studied critical items given at test minus the
unstudied response rates. As can be seen in Table 1, priming was
not reduced by DA, and we conﬁrmed this impression with a one-
way ANOVA conducted on the priming scores, F(2,45) = 1.32,
MSE = 0.006, p = 0.28. Priming was reliably greater than zero
when each condition was analyzed separately, all t(15)s ≥ 3.13,
all ps < 0.01.
We used responses to the questionnaire to classify participants
as unaware of the relationship between study and test phases (test-
unaware), aware of the relationship but did not use intentional
retrieval strategies at test (test-aware), or aware of the relationship
and used intentional retrieval strategies at test (intentional).
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TABLE 1 | Experiment 1 proportions of critical items produced on the
implicit memory test of category exemplar generation (±1 SE in
parentheses).
Condition Studied items Unstudied items Priming
Full sample
FA 0.14 (0.02) 0.08 (0.01) 0.07 (0.02)
DA-Syllable 0.17 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01) 0.11 (0.01)
DA-Semantic 0.13 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01) 0.07 (0.02)
Unaware only
FA 0.16 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02)
DA-Syllable 0.14 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01)
DA-Semantic 0.10 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02)
FA, full attention; DA, divided attention; Unaware Only, participants who did not
report awareness of the relationship between test cues and studied words.
When analyses were restricted to those who were test-unaware
(n = 6, 8, and 11 in the FA, DA-Syllable, and DA-Semantic
conditions, respectively), a reliable diﬀerence in priming emerged
between the groups, F(2,22) = 4.42, MSE = 0.002, p = 0.02,
η2p = 0.29. As can be seen in the lower half of Table 1, priming in
the DA-Semantic condition was reliably lower relative to the FA
condition (p < 0.05) and nearly reliably lower relative to the DA-
Syllable condition (p = 0.06). The DA-Syllable and FA conditions
did not diﬀer reliably from each other (p = 0.95). Thus, among
test-unaware participants, the semantic DA task reduced priming
relative to FA and DA-Syllable conditions.
Distracting Task
As described earlier, there are two ways in which distracting
task performance can be analyzed. Global costs refer to the
performance decrements on the distracting task when carried
out under DA compared to baseline. Speciﬁc costs refer to the
decrements on DA distractor task performance on trials where
categories correspond to studied exemplars (studied trials) are
compared to trials where categories correspond to unstudied
exemplars (unstudied trials). The outcome patterns described
next were the same regardless of whether we analyzed the
full sample or only those that were classiﬁed as test-unaware,
therefore only the results from the full sample are reported.
To assess global costs, we ﬁrst calculated mean accuracy for
the distractor task performed alone, averaged across both blocks
of baseline trials, and compared performance to the same task
when it was undertaken during DA in which the CEG task was
also performed. Filler trials from the DA phase were excluded
from these calculations, leaving 120 DA distractor task trials for
analysis. Inspection of the left two columns of Table 2 suggests
that global costs occurred on the distracting task. Relative to
baseline, accuracy decreased for the syllable and semantic tasks
when either task was performed under DA. This impression was
conﬁrmed by a 2 (task: syllable, semantic) × 2 (block: baseline,
DA) mixed ANOVA on accuracy that returned a main eﬀect of
block, F(1,30) = 134.99, MSE = 0.005, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.82,
as well as a main eﬀect of task in which accuracy was reduced
more for the semantic task than for the syllable judgment task,
F(1,30) = 16.29, MSE = 0.009, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.35. The
interaction was non-reliable, F < 1.
Table 2 also suggests that global costs occurred for RTs on
distractor trials, such that RTs increased on the distracting tasks
when performed under DA. We ﬁrst computed median RTs for
each participant from correct responses to distractor task trials
(excluding all ﬁllers), and Table 2 displays the mean median
values for each condition across participants. A similar ANOVA
on RTs returned a main eﬀect of block, indicating slower RTs for
DA than for baseline overall, F(1,30) = 182.24, MSE = 22,869,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.86. There was also a main eﬀect of task,
indicating slower RTs for the semantic task than for the syllable
judgment task overall, F(1,30) = 8.61, MSE = 55,643, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.22. The interaction was non-reliable, F < 1.
The four right-most columns of Table 2 indicate speciﬁc costs.
Speciﬁc costs would appear as lower accuracy or longer RTs to the
distractor words for studied trials compared to unstudied trials.
Therefore, we compared distractor task performance during
studied trials to that of unstudied trials. Furthermore, because
two distractor items were presented for each category trial, we
included distractor timing (simultaneous with category name
onset versus delayed) as a factor in the analysis. A 2 (task:
syllable, semantic) × 2 (trial: studied, unstudied) × 2 (timing:
simultaneous, delayed) mixed ANOVA returned a main eﬀect of
task, indicating lower accuracy on the semantic distractor task
than the syllable distractor task, F(1,30) = 8.18, MSE = 0.045,
p = 0.008, η2p = 0.21. Additionally, there was a main eﬀect of
timing, F(1,30) = 14.94, MSE = 0.013, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.33,
that was qualiﬁed by an interaction with task, F(1,30) = 4.86,
MSE = 0.013, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.14. Further analysis of the
interaction suggested that, for the semantic task, accuracy was
reliably reduced when distractors appeared simultaneously than
when distractors were delayed (M = 0.59 vs. 0.71, respectively),
F(1,15) = 21.41, MSE = 0.011, p < 0.001, but no such reduction
occurred for the syllable judgment task (M = 0.74 vs. 0.78,
respectively), F(1,15) = 1.21, MSE = 0.015, p = 0.29. All
other eﬀects and interactions were not reliable, all Fs ≤ 2.06,
all ps ≥ 0.16. There were no reliable eﬀects or interactions
associated with trial, which suggests that there were no speciﬁc
costs associated with implicit memory retrieval on distractor task
accuracy.
With respect to RT, the same ANOVA described in the
previous paragraph returned a marginal main eﬀect of task,
indicating shorter RTs for the syllable judgment task than for the
semantic task, F(1,30)= 3.76, p= 0.06, η2p = 0.11. There was also
a reliable main eﬀect of timing, F(1,30) = 30.05,MSE = 170,068,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50, a two-way interaction between timing
and trial, F(1,30) = 5.53, MSE = 13,805, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.16,
and a three-way interaction between timing, trial, and task,
F(1,30) = 16.69, MSE = 13,805, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.36. The
three-way interaction suggests that speciﬁc costs occurred in
the semantic task when distractors were delayed but not when
distractors were presented simultaneously with category names.
Speciﬁcally, RTs to delayed distractors in the semantic DA task
were slower for studied trials than for unstudied trials (M = 1648
vs. 1478 ms, respectively, p= 0.04), but when the distractors were
simultaneous, RTs were somewhat faster for studied trials than for
unstudied trials (M = 1940 vs. 2037 ms, respectively, p = 0.08).
No such pattern emerged for the syllable judgment task.
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TABLE 2 | Experiment 1 accuracy and reaction time (RT) to distracting tasks.
Global costs Specific costs
DA-Studied DA-Unstudied
Baseline DA-Overall Sim Del Sim Del
Accuracy
DA-Syllable 0.95 0.76 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.80
DA-Semantic 0.87 0.65 0.60 0.71 0.58 0.72
RT
DA-Syllable 1061 1594 1865 1455 1777 1439
DA-Semantic 1256 1744 1940 1648 2037 1478
DA, divided attention; Sim, simultaneous distractors; Del, delayed distractors.
Discussion
Divided attention at retrieval had no eﬀect on repetition priming
for the entire sample. However, for test-unaware participants,
DA reduced priming when the distractor task involved semantic
decisions rather than phonological decisions. We discuss this
ﬁnding further in the General Discussion. The CEG task was
clearly associated with global costs, indicating that the task
broadly requires attentional resources. The evidence for speciﬁc
costs was weak, however, emerging only for the DA-Semantic
condition, only for RTs, and only for delayed distractor trials. In
all other cases, no speciﬁc costs or speciﬁc beneﬁts were observed.
The results raise several questions. First, because accuracy
was lower and RTs were longer for the semantic distractor task
compared to the phonological distractor task in every analysis,
the eﬀect of semantic DA on priming in test-unaware participants
may reﬂect distractor task diﬃculty per se rather than the
processing demands of the distractor tasks. We addressed this
concern in Experiment 2 by examining the eﬀects of DA on
the matched explicit test of category-cued recall. If the results
from Experiment 1 reﬂect distractor task diﬃculty, we would
expect a similar pattern of outcomes for recall: signiﬁcantly lower
recall rates for the DA-Semantic condition compared to the DA-
Syllable condition. Second, the baseline rate of responding with
exemplars from the unstudied list in the CEG task was quite low,
ranging from 0.06 to 0.08, raising the concern of ﬂoor eﬀects
reducing the magnitude of priming. We addressed that concern
in Experiment 3, in which we used exemplars with a higher rate
of baseline responding.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
Forty-eight undergraduate students (32 women, 16men), none of
whom participated in Experiment 1, participated in Experiment 2
for course credit or for pay.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception
that the test was now a category-cued recall test. At test,
participants were instructed to use the category names as cues
to recall aloud the words that they had rated for pleasantness at
the beginning of the experimental session. They were told further
that not all category names would correspond to earlier-rated
words, and if a category did not bring anything to mind they
were to remain silent. Participants in the FA condition ignored
the spoken words that accompanied the category names, whereas
participants in the DA-Syllable and DA-Semantic conditions
responded to the spoken words via keypress in ways appropriate
to their condition while simultaneously recalling exemplars.
Results
Encoding
Participants provided pleasantness ratings to 99.4, 98.5, and 99.2
percent of the words in the FA, DA-Syllable, and DA-Semantic
conditions, respectively. These diﬀerences were not reliable,
F < 1.
Explicit Memory
The dependent measure is the proportion of studied exemplars
that were recalled minus the proportion of unstudied critical
items that were falsely retrieved (unstudied critical items were
recalled less than 0.5% of the time). These values were 0.42,
0.31, and 0.27 for the FA, DA-Syllable, and DA-Semantic tasks,
respectively, and they were reliably diﬀerent by a one-way
ANOVA, F(2,45) = 4.57, MSE = 0.024, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.17.
Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests revealed that, relative to FA, the
DA-Syllable condition was marginally lower (p = 0.09) and
the DA-Semantic condition was reliably lower (p = 0.02), but,
importantly, the two DA conditions did not diﬀer from each
other (p = 0.72).
Distracting Task
Global and speciﬁc costs to the distracting task were calculated in
the same way as in Experiment 1, and the results are displayed
in Table 3. Recognition produced global costs to distractor
task accuracy, such that DA trials were associated with worse
performance compared to baseline trials, in both DA-Syllable
and DA-Semantic tasks (see Table 3). These impressions were
conﬁrmed in a 2 (task: syllable, semantic) × 2 (block: baseline,
DA) mixed ANOVA on accuracy that returned a main eﬀect of
block, F(1,30) = 37.77, MSE = 0.013, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.56, and
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TABLE 3 | Experiment 2 accuracy and reaction time (RT) to distracting tasks.
Global costs Specific costs
DA-Studied DA-Unstudied
Baseline DA-Overall Sim Del Sim Del
Accuracy
DA-Syllable 0.92 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.74 0.80
DA-Semantic 0.79 0.61 0.56 0.63 0.58 0.68
RT
DA-Syllable 1191 1746 1967 1610 2014 1544
DA-Semantic 1334 1705 1927 1538 1904 1590
DA, divided attention; Sim, simultaneous distractors; Del, delayed distractors.
a main eﬀect of task, F(1,30) = 12.02, MSE = 0.025, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.29. The interaction was non-reliable, F < 1.
Recognition also produced global costs to distractor task RTs.
Speciﬁcally, RTs to distractors (correct responses only) increased
under DA trials than under baseline trials, and more so for
syllable judgments than for semantic judgments (see Table 3).
These impressions were conﬁrmed in a similar ANOVA on
RTs that returned a reliable eﬀect of block, F(1,30) = 180.28,
MSE = 19,051, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.86, and an interaction between
task and block, F(1,30)= 7.11,MSE= 19,051, p= 0.01, η2p = 0.19.
The main eﬀect of task was not reliable, F < 1. An analysis
of the interaction revealed that the RT diﬀerence between the
DA-Syllable and DA-Semantic group was marginally reliable for
baseline trials (p = 0.06), but the same diﬀerence for DA trials
was not reliable (p = 0.50). The diﬀerence between baseline and
DA trials was reliable for each group when analyzed separately,
both ps < 0.001.
We analyzed speciﬁc costs with 2 (task: syllable, semantic)× 2
(trial: studied, unstudied) × 2 (timing: simultaneous, delayed)
mixed ANOVAs, as in Experiment 1. With respect to accuracy,
this analysis returned three eﬀects, a marginally reliable main
eﬀect of trial in which distractor task accuracy was better for
unstudied trials than for studied trials (M = 0.70 vs. 0.66,
respectively), F(1,30) = 3.31, MSE = 0.01, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.10,
a reliable main eﬀect of timing in which accuracy was better for
delayed trials than for simultaneous trials (M = 0.72 vs. 0.65,
respectively), F(1,30)= 23.45,MSE= 0.006, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.44,
and a reliable main eﬀect of condition in which accuracy was
better for the syllable judgment task than for the semantic
judgment task (M = 0.75 vs. 0.61, respectively), F(1,30) = 6.15,
MSE= 0.10, p= 0.02, η2p = 0.17. All other eﬀects and interactions
were not reliable, all Fs < 1. With respect to RT, the ANOVA
returned only a main eﬀect of timing in which RTs were longer
for simultaneous trials compared to delayed trials (M = 1953
vs. 1571 ms, respectively), F(1,30) = 43.81, MSE = 106,853,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.59. All other eﬀects were not reliable, all
Fs ≤ 2.50, all ps ≥ 0.12.
Discussion
Experiment 2 produced several notable results. First, DA at
retrieval reduced explicit memory using the category-cued recall
test, a result that extends previous studies of retrieval-phase
DA on explicit memory to include category-cued recall (e.g.,
Fernandes and Moscovitch, 2000; Clarke and Butler, 2008;
Lozito and Mulligan, 2010). Second, the two DA tasks had
a similar impact on explicit memory, suggesting that the
reduction in priming observed among test-unaware participants
in Experiment 1 cannot be attributed solely to the diﬃculty
of the semantic DA task. If that were the case, the semantic
DA task would have reduced explicit memory signiﬁcantly
more than the syllable DA task, but that outcome did not
emerge. Third, category-cued recall produced global costs to the
distractor tasks, similar to that of CEG, which indicates that the
category-cued recall task broadly requires attentional resources.
Fourth, the pattern of speciﬁc costs on the category-cued
recall task diﬀered from that of CEG. Distractor task accuracy
was reduced, albeit marginally, on studied trials compared
to unstudied trials, indicating a speciﬁc cost associated with
retrieving studied items. No such cost occurred when CEG was
used as the test. We return to these points in the General
Discussion.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 1 using a diﬀerent
set of stimuli for the CEG test. Recall that one concern about
Experiment 1 was that baseline response rates to the CEG
task were quite low, thereby raising the concern that ﬂoor
eﬀects attenuated priming. Although priming was reliable in
each attention condition of Experiment 1, their magnitudes were
lower than the 0.10–0.20 priming eﬀects that are typically seen
in other studies of attention and CEG priming (e.g., Schmitter-
Edgecombe, 1996; Gabrieli et al., 1999; Light et al., 2000; Lozito
and Mulligan, 2010). By raising baseline rates of completion, the
expectation was that priming eﬀects would better resemble those
of previous studies and provide an additional test of whether
retrieval-phase DA impacts priming.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight undergraduate students (31 women, 17 men), none
of whom participated in the previous experiments, participated
in Experiment 3 for course credit or for pay.
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Materials
We constructed a new set of 60 category exemplars from the
critical, non-ﬁller categories that were used in Experiments
1 and 2. Speciﬁcally, we relaxed the constraint that exemplars
could not occur as one of the top three responses of each category
in the category norms, andwe chose exemplars that had a baseline
probability of response that was around 0.30, similar to that of
Lozito andMulligan (2010, Experiment 3), in the category norms.
This new master list was divided into two 30-item lists to serve
as the studied-unstudied counterbalance, as in Experiment 1.
With the exception of one category that was replaced, all category
names at test (30 studied, 30 unstudied, 30 ﬁller) were unchanged
from previous experiments.
Design and Procedure
The design and procedure were identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results
Encoding
Participants provided pleasantness ratings to 99.7, 99.4, and 99.0
percent of the critical words in the FA, DA-Syllable, and DA-
Semantic conditions, respectively. These diﬀerences were not
reliable, F < 1.
Implicit Memory
Proportions of critical items produced on the CEG test by the
full sample are shown in the top half of Table 4. Baseline rates
of responding were substantially higher than that of Experiment
1 and did not diﬀer across attention conditions, F < 1. As
expected with the higher baseline rates, priming scores were
also substantially larger than those of Experiment 1. Inspection
of the priming scores in Table 4 suggests that, like Experiment
1, priming was unaﬀected by DA, and that impression was
conﬁrmed by a one-way ANOVA, F(2,45) = 0.32, MSE = 0.02,
p = 0.73. Priming was reliably greater than zero when each
condition was analyzed separately, all t(15)s≥ 5.76, all ps< 0.001.
As in Experiment 1, participants were classiﬁed as test-
unaware, test-aware, and intentional based on their responses
to the awareness questionnaire. The lower half of Table 4
presents the proportions for the six DA-Syllable and ﬁve DA-
Semantic participants that were classiﬁed as test-unaware (no FA
TABLE 4 | Experiment 3 proportions of critical items produced on the
implicit memory test of category exemplar generation (±1 SE in
parentheses).
Condition Studied items Unstudied items Priming
Full sample
FA 0.40 (0.03) 0.23 (0.02) 0.17 (0.03)
DA-Syllable 0.44 (0.03) 0.24 (0.02) 0.21 (0.03)
DA-Semantic 0.42 (0.03) 0.23 (0.01) 0.19 (0.03)
Unaware only
DA-Syllable 0.41 (0.07) 0.21 (0.05) 0.21 (0.07)
DA-Semantic 0.34 (0.05) 0.23 (0.02) 0.11 (0.04)
FA, full attention; DA, divided attention; Unaware Only, participants who did not
report awareness of the relationship between test cues and studied words.
participant was classiﬁed as test-unaware). Although priming in
the DA-Semantic condition was about half that of the DA-Syllable
condition, the diﬀerence did not achieve signiﬁcance, t(9) = 1.10,
p = 0.30, most likely owing to the low statistical power in this
analysis.
Distracting Tasks
Global and speciﬁc costs were calculated in the same manner
as described in Experiment 1, and the results are displayed
in Table 5. Global costs occurred for both accuracy and RT
measures, and were generally similar to those seen in Experiment
1. A 2 (task: syllable, semantic) × 2 (block: baseline, DA)
mixed ANOVA on accuracy indicated two main eﬀects, such
that accuracy was lower on the DA block compared to baseline,
F(1,30) = 142.21, MSE = 0.005, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.83, and
accuracy was lower on the semantic task than for the syllable
judgment task, F(1,30)= 8.62,MSE = 0.014, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.22.
The interaction was non-reliable, F < 1. The same ANOVA
applied to RT revealed only a main eﬀect of block, such that RTs
increased for the DA block relative to baseline, F(1,30) = 212.30,
MSE = 21,924, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.88. All other Fs< 1.
Speciﬁc costs on accuracy were analyzed with a 2 (task:
syllable, semantic) × 2 (trial: studied, unstudied) × 2 (timing:
simultaneous, delayed) mixed ANOVA. Two main eﬀects were
obtained in this analysis. The eﬀect of timing indicated that
responses to distractor trials were less accurate if distractors were
presented simultaneously with the category cue compared to
delayed distractors, F(1,30) = 22.51, MSE = 0.01, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.43. The eﬀect of task indicated that responses to the
semantic task were less accurate overall compared to the syllable
task, F(1,30) = 5.40, MSE = 0.06, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.15. All other
Fs≤ 1.61, all ps≥ 0.21. The same ANOVA applied to RT revealed
only a main eﬀect of timing, such that RTs were longer for
simultaneous trials compared to delayed trials, F(1,30) = 59.19,
MSE = 168,903, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.66. All other Fs< 1. Note that
trial type did not enter into any reliable eﬀects or interactions,
suggesting that there were no speciﬁc costs associated with
implicit memory retrieval.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The overarching goal of the present study was to determine
whether conceptual implicit memory was sensitive to DA at
retrieval. Previous studies have reported that priming in a variety
of implicit memory tasks is insensitive to retrieval-phase DA,
a result that supports the automatic retrieval view (Clarke and
Butler, 2008; Lozito and Mulligan, 2010). However, previous
studies did not vary the similarity of processing required by the
distracting task and the implicit memory task. The present study
did so using the conceptually driven implicit memory task of
CEG and using distracting tasks that either required judgments
about the sound of words or the meaning of words. The former
condition (DA-Syllable) is assumed to involve phonological
processes in the distracting task that diﬀer from the semantic or
conceptual processes required by the implicit memory task, and
the latter condition (DA-Semantic) is assumed to involve similar
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TABLE 5 | Experiment 3 accuracy and reaction time (RT) to distracting tasks.
Global costs Specific costs
DA-Studied DA-Unstudied
Baseline DA-Overall Sim Del Sim Del
Accuracy
DA-Syllable 0.95 0.76 0.73 0.78 0.70 0.82
DA-Semantic 0.88 0.66 0.62 0.72 0.61 0.68
RT
DA-Syllable 1145 1720 2056 1491 2067 1489
DA-Semantic 1229 1732 2030 1488 2006 1456
DA, divided attention; Sim, simultaneous distractors; Del, delayed distractors.
semantic processes across the two tasks. Process-speciﬁc DA
eﬀects can occur in explicit memory (Fernandes and Guild, 2009;
Wammes and Fernandes, 2015) but to our knowledge this study is
the ﬁrst to examine whether implicit memory is susceptible to the
same sort of eﬀect. In this discussion, we ﬁrst consider the impact
of our DA tasks on implicit and explicit memory, then we turn
our attention to the impact of the CEG and category-cued recall
tasks on general and speciﬁc costs to distractor task performance.
The ﬁrst major result is that conceptual implicit memory
was unaﬀected by any type of retrieval-phase DA task when
full samples were considered (Experiments 1 and 3). We ﬁnd
this outcome surprising, considering the fact that we created
an especially powerful set of conditions in which a DA eﬀect
on implicit memory could be seen. Speciﬁcally, we used the
CEG test, a conceptually driven implicit memory task that
requires stimulus production. Both TAP and the identiﬁcation-
production framework agree that attention is necessary for full
priming on that task, and encoding-phase DA eﬀects on CEG
priming are robust (Spataro et al., 2011). Thus, among implicit
memory tasks, the CEG task should be most likely to reveal any
DA eﬀects in priming that may exist. We also used distracting
tasks that required frequent rather than occasional responding
and paid careful attention to the timing of distracting and implicit
memory test stimuli. Response frequency and timing of tasks are
both factors that are known to modulate DA eﬀects on priming
in some implicit memory tasks (Mulligan, 2003; Mulligan et al.,
2007). Despite those design features, there was no hint of a DA
eﬀect across two experiments, at least when the full samples in
both experiments were considered. Note that, if anything, the
DA eﬀect on priming was in the opposite direction, that is,
numerically greater priming under DA conditions relative to FA.
That fact indicates that the failure to ﬁnd statistically reliable
diﬀerences among conditions is not likely to reﬂect trends toward
a DA eﬀect on priming that were undetected due to a lack of
power.
The priming outcomes for the full samples in Experiments 1
and 3 join other studies that have found support for the automatic
retrieval hypothesis (Clarke and Butler, 2008; Lozito and
Mulligan, 2010). According to that hypothesis, implicit memory
is unaﬀected by retrieval-phase division of attention. The novel
contribution of the present study is that the automatic retrieval
hypothesis applies to implicit memory regardless of the similarity
in processes between the distracting task and memory task. That
is, conceptual priming appears to be insensitive to material-
speciﬁc interference as well as process-speciﬁc interference by
retrieval-phase DA. The results are less well understood by
the TAP and identiﬁcation-production perspectives, however.
According to TAP (Roediger and McDermott, 1993), conceptual
processes are aﬀected by DA and should therefore impact
performance on conceptually driven implicit memory tasks, of
which the CEG task is a type. According to the identiﬁcation-
production account (Gabrieli et al., 1999), attention is critical for
production priming tasks, and the CEG task is unambiguously
such a task. The data therefore favor the automatic retrieval view.
Participants classiﬁed as unaware in Experiments 1 and
3 showed priming eﬀects that were reduced by DA. In
Experiment 1, priming in the DA-Semantic task was about half
that of the DA-Syllable and FA conditions, and in Experiment
3, priming in the DA-Semantic task was numerically lower
than that of the DA-Syllable condition. While these results
seem to challenge the automatic retrieval view and suggest the
existence of process-speciﬁc interference, we exercise caution
in interpreting these outcomes. First, the DA-related reductions
in priming were not general eﬀects, but emerged only among
unaware participants. Second, the ﬁndings are based on very
small subsamples of the original FA and DA groups. Third,
evidence for process-speciﬁc interference would be obtained if
priming was reliably reduced in the DA-Semantic condition
compared to the DA-Syllable condition, but that reduction was
marginal in Experiment 1 and non-reliable in Experiment 2, and
a combined analysis of all unaware participants in Experiments
1 and 3 did not reveal reliable diﬀerences among conditions
(p = 0.09). Finally, the analyses of speciﬁc costs on the distractor
tasks do not provide additional evidence against the automatic
retrieval view (a speciﬁc cost in the DA-Syllable condition was
found for RT in Experiment 1, but no speciﬁc costs were
observed in Experiment 3). Nevertheless, the results from the
unaware participants hint at the possibility that process-speciﬁc
interference in implicit memory could occur under very speciﬁc
conditions (conceptually driven tests, unaware participants).
Future studies with larger numbers of unaware participants may
ﬁnd results that challenge the automatic retrieval view, however,
we believe the weight of evidence currently favors the automatic
retrieval view.
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The eﬀects of DA on explicit memory diﬀered from those
seen on implicit memory. In explicit memory, both semantic
and phonological distracting tasks worked to reduce performance
on category-cued recall with no reliable diﬀerence between the
two DA conditions (Experiment 2). This outcome ﬁts well
with the view that retrieval-phase DA can negatively aﬀect
explicit memory under some situations, particularly when the
distracting task and memory task employ similar materials
(Fernandes and Moscovitch, 2000). However, process-speciﬁc
interference in explicit memory was not observed. Process-
speciﬁc interference has been most commonly observed using
non-verbal stimuli such as faces or visuospatial patterns;
such interference eﬀects have been examined with words less
often but appear to be less commonly observed. In one
study (Fernandes and Guild, 2009), retrieval-phase DA eﬀects
on recognition for words were numerically lower when the
distracting task involved phonological judgments (does the
sound of a consonant letter, presented visually, rhyme with
“ee”?) rather than visuospatial judgments (does a consonant letter
contain a curved line?), however, this diﬀerence was not reliable
in a direct comparison. Other studies that have used semantic
and phonological distracting tasks similar to those described
in the present investigation have also shown little diﬀerence
in recall performance between DA conditions (Fernandes and
Moscovitch, 2000).
Turning to the distractor task, we found that the automatic
retrieval hypothesis gained support through the analysis of global
and speciﬁc costs. As expected, global costs emerged in the
syllable and semantic judgment tasks when performed under DA
conditions in the presence of the CEG task. Global costs, however,
cannot say whether implicit memory retrieval is automatic, only
that the CEG task per se requires attentional resources. Only an
analysis of speciﬁc costs provides a focused test of the automatic
retrieval hypothesis, and that analysis generally supports that
hypothesis. The automatic retrieval hypothesis would be refuted
if performance decrements occurred on the distracting task for
studied trials compared to unstudied trials. As mentioned earlier,
this outcome occurred in only one situation in Experiment 1
(RTs for delayed distractors in the DA-Semantic condition) and
was not replicated in Experiment 3. Most analyses revealed no
diﬀerence between studied and unstudied trials, or uncovered
speciﬁc beneﬁts in which distracting performance was facilitated
during studied trials. The facilitation may be due to the relative
availability of resources when studied material is more ﬂuently
and quickly processed at test (see Lozito and Mulligan, 2010, for
further discussion).
A somewhat diﬀerent pattern of secondary task costs emerged
for category-cued recall. As expected, global costs occurred
on distractor task performance and may reﬂect the attention-
demanding costs of establishing retrieval mode (see, e.g., Naveh-
Benjamin et al., 1998). A trend toward speciﬁc costs that was
observed in distractor task accuracy may highlight the use of a
metacognitive strategy, such that participants spendmore time or
make more eﬀort to retrieve words from category cues believed
to be helpful. Alternatively, they may terminate the retrieval
process earlier for category cues that are judged to be less helpful.
Either or both patterns would create more resources available for
unstudied trials, and thus better performance on distracting tasks,
together with fewer resources available for studied trials, and thus
worse performance on distracting tasks (Lozito and Mulligan,
2010).
In summary, the present experiments investigated retrieval-
phaseDA on implicit memory and reinforce the conclusions from
previous studies that implicit memory retrieval is automatic. On
the whole, implicit memory is unaﬀected by retrieval-phase DA
regardless of whether distracting tasks use similar materials as
the memory task, and now regardless of whether distracting
tasks use similar processes as the memory task. It remains to be
seen in further research whether (a) process-speciﬁc interference
eﬀects in implicit memory emerge with larger samples of unaware
participants, and (b) priming in other implicit memory tests,
such as word-stem completion, lexical decision, and semantic
veriﬁcation, is also automatic when distractor tasks overlap with
the retrieval processes used in those tests.
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